It appears from the previous Chapters that Cyprus follows a diff erentiated path of integration, the main components of which have already been presented and/or examined. In Chapter 3, diff erent types of differentiation contained in the 2003 Treaty of Accession were identifi ed, leading to the "asymmetric non-participation of individual Member States in selected areas of Union activity", 828 including Cyprus. In Chapter 4, it was demonstrated that Protocol 3 is rather an instance of intergovernmental diff erentiation at the EU constitutional and institutional level, to the extent that it amends the EC Treaty on the basis of an international agreement between Member States and that it provides for further bilateral co-operation between Member States within the framework of EU law.
Drawing on the terminology on diff erentiation identifi ed by Stubb, 829 the 2003 Treaty of Accession appears to constitute an intense exercise of supranational 'graduated' or 'multi-speed' integration determined in time and/or space, completed by substantial elements of 'multi-level' integration or 'variable geometry' in certain policy areas, triggered either at the supranational level (Schengen, EMU, freedom of movement of workers) or by intergovernmental mechanisms (Protocol 3). In any case, membership 'à-la-carte' seems to be absent from the menu. Whereas Stubb associates 'multi-speed' integration to time and 'variable geometry' to space as a determining factor respectively, it is contended that 'variable geometry' , like integration 'à-la-carte' , is determined by the substance of integration as opposed to any other factor. It is rather the institutionalisation of the integration of cyprus 173
830 "Dans le cas du concept de 'géometrie variable' , la majeure partie de l'activité et du droit communautaires est considerée comme inaccessible au recours à une diff érencia-tion en fonction de la matière. Dans le cas du concept 'à-la-carte' , le domaine inaccessible est très restraint, voire inexistent"; in Ehlermann, 194. 831 Th ym (2006) 783. 832 Ehlermann, 195. scope of the restraint on the substance of integration that matters, 830 to the eff ect that 'variable geometry' and integration 'à-la-carte' are variations of the same type of diff erentiation, determined by the intensity of the exception/derogation as a variable.
All the instances of fl exibility studied so far have one point in common, in so far as they are part of the EU legal order. Th e legal instruments concerned normally apply to all Member States "with only their legal eff ects being suspended or modifi ed with regard to some Member States. Th e law does not have a limited geographic scope which generally exempts a Member State from its geographic fi eld of application. Th is common ground extends to transitional periods which have been a regulatory tool of successive enlargements".
831 Protocol 3 would also appear to fall within this broader network of diff erentiation, like any other territory of a Member State falling prima facie into the EU legal order but benefi ting from a diff erentiated regime, whereby Community law is applicable albeit to a limited extent.
A study of Cyprus' diff erentiated path of integration would not be complete however without a thorough examination of Protocol 10 annexed to the 2003 Treaty of Accession, as it does not appear to fi t into the types of diff erentiation described above. Th e regime put in place by Protocol 10 deals with the de facto division of the island and, as such, is deemed to be temporary. With respect to the duration of a diff erentiation, Ehlermann argues as follows:
Th ere is no easy answer to the question whether rules which diff erentiate have to be limited and what are their ultimate deadlines. Th e two most important factors are the type of situation which justifi es diff erentiation and the existence or absence of an obligation to act. While natural diff erences (like climate and distance) are likely to justify permanent diff erentiation, situations that are the product of historical development of human societies (diff erences of taste according to the terminology used by H. and W. Wallace) are more likely to call for only temporary diff erentiation. Th is is particularly so if they are at the root of diff erentiation in areas where the Community has a precise obligation to act in order to bring about a certain result.
